Important Information

Information contained in this presentation regarding Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. ("Valeant") is taken directly from the information publicly disclosed by Valeant and we do not make any representations or warranties, either express or implied, with respect to such information’s accuracy or completeness. In addition, certain other information contained in this presentation is based on publicly available sources as of the date of this presentation, and while we have no reason to believe that such information is not accurate, we can provide no such assurances with respect thereto. IMS data used in this presentation has been purchased from IMS Health, a provider of healthcare information. The information in this presentation represents the opinions of Allergan and Investors and stockholders should make their own independent investigations of the matters referenced in this presentation and draw their own conclusions.
Introduction

- As Allergan’s Board of Directors stated on May 12, 2014, the Valeant/Pershing Square unsolicited proposal of April 22, 2014 substantially undervalues Allergan - regardless of the consideration mix.
- Over the course of the past several weeks since the Valeant/Pershing Square proposal, we have met with many of our stockholders and stock analysts.
- During those conversations, many stockholders and stock analysts expressed serious concerns about the sustainability of Valeant’s business model. Some of the key themes included:
  - Valeant’s low organic sales growth (driven mostly by price increases)
  - Sustainability of acquisitions strategy
  - Low R&D investment and the impact on future growth
  - Market share erosion due to lack of sales and marketing infrastructure and investment
  - Lack of transparency in financial reporting and sustainability of tax structure
- Given that the Valeant unsolicited proposal includes a substantial amount of Valeant stock in exchange for acquiring Allergan, this is a serious concern for Allergan stockholders.
- In order to respond to concerns expressed by some of our stockholders, Allergan engaged two independent, third party consultants and forensic accountants to conduct an initial review of Valeant based on publicly available information.
  - Alvarez & Marsal and FTI Consulting have reviewed this analysis and confirmed key components presented herein.
Key Questions About Valeant That All Of Allergan’s Stockholders Should Consider

- What is Valeant’s real organic growth?
- How have the two largest Valeant acquisitions (Bausch & Lomb and Medicis) performed under Valeant’s ownership? How have other acquisitions performed?
- Does Valeant have any experience promoting products of Allergan’s scale?
- How stable is Valeant’s management team?
- Can Valeant cut $2.7bn of Allergan’s expenses without disrupting the performance of the business?
- What is the relative distribution strength of Allergan vs. Valeant in prescription ophthalmology in significant emerging markets (BRIC)?
- Is Valeant’s stated tax rate achievable and sustainable?
- Are Valeant’s accounting practices consistent with others in the industry?
- Is a business model centered on a serial acquisition and cost cutting strategy sustainable?
- What do Allergan's stockholders "gain" by merging with Valeant?
What is Valeant’s Real Organic Revenue Growth? Dissecting Organic Growth Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q1 2014 Revenue Growth Rates</th>
<th>FY 2013 Revenue Growth Rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organic Growth Ex-Generics Impact (As Reported by Valeant)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Organic Growth Including Generics Impact (As Reported by Valeant)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Forma Revenue Growth</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.5%)</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.4%)</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5.0%)</td>
<td>(5.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0%)</td>
<td>(0.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The pro-forma revenue growth from Valeant’s SEC filings paints a picture far different from what is communicated to the investors and management seems to change reporting methodology when convenient.

Source: Valeant SEC public filings.
Note: Permission to use quotes was neither sought nor received.
Note: Pro–forma revenue reviewed by independent consultants and forensic accountants. Presents unaudited consolidated results of operations, as if the acquisitions had occurred at the beginning of the fiscal period as disclosed in the 10-Ks and 10-Qs. From footnotes to Valeant 10-Q, first quarter 2014 pro-forma revenue of $1,889.9mm decreased from first quarter pro-forma 2013 revenue of $1,917.1mm. From footnotes to Valeant 10-K, full year 2013 pro-forma revenue of $7,665.9mm decreased from 2012 full year pro-forma revenue of $7,700.6mm.
What are the Drivers of Valeant’s Top-Line Growth and How Transparent is the Sales Reporting?

Acquisitions are driving Valeant’s top-line growth

Revenue Bridge - FY11 - FY13

- FY11: $2,427
- FY12: $3,480
- FY13: $5,770

**Source:** Valeant 8-Ks Table 6 – Organic Growth – by Segment.

**Note:** Reviewed by independent consultants and forensic accountants. 2012 acquisitions include: Medicis, certain assets of Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, certain assets of QLT Inc. and QLT Ophthalmics, OraPharma Topco Holdings, certain assets of University Medical Pharmaceuticals, certain assets of Atlantis Pharma, certain assets of Gerot Lannach and Probiotica Laboratorios. 2013 acquisitions include: B&L, Obagi Medical products, Certain assets of Eisai and Natur Produkt International. (1) Base business includes amounts Valeant categorizes as organic, developed markets, and other.

- **2011**
  - US Neurology and Other
  - US Dermatology
  - Canada and Australia
  - Branded Generics – Europe
  - Branded Generics – Latin America

- **2012**
  - US Neurology and Other
  - US Dermatology
  - Canada and Australia
  - Emerging Markets

- **2013**
  - Developed Markets
  - Emerging Markets

*Valeant realigned its segment reporting structure 3 times in the past 3 years, decreasing the level of disaggregation each time*

*In a survey conducted by an independent consultant, Valeant was the only pharmaceutical company that organizes segments on a geographic basis with no product detail*
How Has The Prescription Ophthalmology Business of Bausch & Lomb Performed In The U.S. Post Acquisition?

“This morning we reported Valeant’s fourth quarter results for 2013, which were driven by strong sales growth and profitability across all our regions, including **continued outperformance from Bausch & Lomb**, since the August 5 close.”

Michael Pearson, CEO, 02/27/14

**IMS Data Suggests That Most Of Bausch & Lomb’s Growth Is Attributable To What We Believe Are Unsustainable Price Increases**

Source: Analysis based upon IMS FIRST Q4 2013 vs. Q4 2012. Total U.S. Bausch & Lomb sales represents Eye Care.

Note: Individual products listed denote products that were launched after 2012.

Note: Permission to use quotes was neither sought nor received.

Note: Reviewed by independent consultants and forensic accountants.
How Has Medicis Performed Post Acquisition?

U.S. Aesthetic Neuromodulator Market Share

Dysport Market Share
Pre-acquisition: ~17%
April 2014: ~14%

Medicis U.S. Pricing Per Product Trends

Pre-Acquisition
Post-Acquisition

DYSPORT®
RESTYLANE®
PERLANE®

0.5mL
1.0mL
2.0mL

$475
$432
$265
+$14%
+$11%
+$11%

$541
$479
$293
+$16%
+$11%
+$11%

$151
$240
$265

$175
$266

$240
$266

$240
$266

$240
$266

FY12 to FY 13 Price and Volume Changes (Global)

SOLODYN®
ZIANA®
LIDEMOL® / VANOS®
ALDARA®

(27%)
(6%)
43%
(27%)

% Variance

Rapid erosion of durable Medicis business within a short time following acquisition

Products listed are registered trademarks. Source: Guidepoint Global (historical figures Q1’14 and prior based upon the March 2014 panel). April 2014 figures based on April 2014 panel.
(1) Includes all Valeant (Medicis) fillers, including the RESTYLANE® brand.
(2) Pre-Acquisition indicates pricing data prior to Medicis acquisition by Valeant. Post-Acquisition indicates pricing data for 01-Mar-2013 for all products except DYSPORT® (01-Apr-2014). Price per vial / syringe.
(3) Source: IMS per list pricing.
**Does Valeant Have Any Experience Promoting Products Of Allergan’s Scale?**

Allergan would be Valeant's largest acquisition

**2013 Revenue ($mm)**

- **$1,982**
- **$940**
- **$625**
- **$478**
- **$474**
- **$378**
- **$100**
- **$277**
- **$240**
- **$168**
- **$150**
- **$124**
- **$115**
- **$114**
- **$104**
- **$93**
- **$81**
- **$77**
- **$76**
- **$74**
- **$72**
- **$63**
- **$62**
- **$59**
- **$57**
- **$54**
- **$50**
- **$49**
- **$46**
- **$44**

**Key Allergan Products and Key Valeant Products Globally**

Valeant’s limited experience with large, global scale products represents a material execution risk attempting to grow Allergan’s categories and launching significant new large products through existing channels.

**Note:**
- Allergan data represents 2013 reported net sales per SEC filings.
- Valeant data per IMS NPA data, IMS Analytic Link, IMS FIRST which is at WAC pricing and is reported at gross.
- * Based on industry sources. $425mm at gross but affected by alternative fulfillments.
- (1) LUMIGAN® and ALPHAGAN® represent both franchises, respectively.
- (2) LOTEMAX® sales include LOTEMAX® solution and LOTEMAX® gel.
- (3) DYSPORT®, RESTYLANE® and SCULPTRA® represent net sales, based on Allergan estimates triangulated with Guidepoint Global data.
How Stable is Valeant’s Management Team?

### Significant Management Turnover

- **Lack of Reimbursed Pharmaceutical Experience**
- **Lack Of Experience Managing Complex Global Businesses**

### 2011 Executive Officers *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>Present Executive Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rajiv De Silva</td>
<td>Rajiv De Silva</td>
<td>Rajiv De Silva</td>
<td>Rajiv De Silva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhilipW. Leborg</td>
<td>PhilipW. Leborg</td>
<td>PhilipW. Leborg</td>
<td>PhilipW. Leborg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Durham</td>
<td>Mark Durham</td>
<td>Mark Durham</td>
<td>Mark Durham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Masterson</td>
<td>Richard Masterson</td>
<td>Howard B. Schiller</td>
<td>Howard B. Schiller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Susan Hall</td>
<td>Dr. Susan Hall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Howard B. Schiller</td>
<td>Dr. Susan Hall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Susan Hall</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### In Addition, Recently Three Board Members (3) Replaced, Citing “Potential Conflicts” For Two Of Them, One Of Them Withdrawing After A Tenure Of Less Than A Year

- As disclosed on 2011 proxy.
- (1) Entered into a separation agreement with Valeant on May 8, 2013. Remained as consultant for a period of two months.
- (2) Previously at Bausch & Lomb, left after <1 year.
- (3) Left Valeant Board due to having full-time investment jobs that could limit their professional effectiveness.

Source: Company Filings, press releases.
How do Valeant’s Announced Synergies for Allergan Compare to Other Transactions that Valeant has Announced?

Valeant’s Synergy Estimates for Allergan Are Much Higher Than What It Has Announced for Other Acquisitions – Valeant Is Incentivized To Overstate Synergies Given Significant Stock Component In Its Offer

Source: Company Filings, Wall Street research, the Wall Street Journal and FactSet as of 05/02/14.
(1) Indicates a failed hostile bid.
(2) Based on 2012A Operating expenditures per B&L filings and announced synergies of $800mm.
(3) Based on mid-point of Allergan’s guidance as of 05/07/14.
Is Allergan’s Core Business At Risk Under Valeant Ownership?

**Observations and Considerations**

- Valeant will only be able to achieve a fraction of stated SG&A and R&D synergies without destroying Allergan’s long-term value.
- Valeant drastically understates R&D spend required for post approval and maintenance, product line extensions and late phase projects.
- Valeant's purported SG&A synergies are unrealistic given the company’s stated goals:
  - “I want to reassure all of you that we remain committed to investing in you and in the fields of Dermatology, Aesthetics and Eye Care”
  -- *Michael Pearson -- Letter to customers on 5/19/14*
  - “Investment in sales professionals to drive long-term relationships and create brand equity with medical stakeholders”. “Valeant focuses on selling over marketing”.
  -- *Per Presentation Made on 4/22/14*

A Significant Portion of Valeant's Proposed Synergies are Already Captured in Allergan’s Strategic Plan, But in a Measured Way That Will Enable Sustainable Growth.

**Allergan 2013 Actual Standalone vs. Allergan Under Valeant Cost Cuts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Allergan 2013 Actual</th>
<th>Valeant Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SG&amp;A Ratio</td>
<td>~39%</td>
<td>~17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D Ratio</td>
<td>~10%</td>
<td>~2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Allergan management projections, Valeant management investor meeting, 22-Apr-2014. (1) As a % of FY 2013 Allergan sales.
Are Valeant’s Purported R&D Synergies Achievable?

Valeant’s CEO has Committed to More R&D Projects than It Can Afford Under the Purported R&D Budget

- "...What we will do is formulation work, line extension work, and with BOTOX® we’ll try to get as many indications as we possibly can.”
  (Source: 22-Apr-2014 Valeant Investor Presentation)

- “As we’ve mentioned to you all, we’re going to spend around $300 million [on R&D] this year. But as we told you, we’d be at a $200 million run rate at the end of the year.”
  (Source: 22-Apr-2014 Valeant Investor Presentation)

- “We will focus on developing late-stage compounds and evolving our products through lifecycle management.”
  (Source: 13-May-2014 Valeant Customer Letter)

- “As we have shown following our acquisitions of Bausch + Lomb and Medicis, we expect to maintain all late-stage development programs in both companies and all new indication work for BOTOX®.”
  (Source: 13-May-2014 Valeant Customer Letter)

- “We recognize the value of Investigator-Initiated Studies (IITs) and we expect to increase our activities in this area across Dermatology, Aesthetics and Eye Care to further our understanding of the benefits of our products in clinical practice.”
  (Source: 19-May-2014 Valeant Customer Letter)

- “We intend to retain their key programs like Brilliant Distinctions®, maintain investment in direct to consumer campaigns that bring patients into your offices, and invest in those R&D programs across both companies that will deliver new products for your patients and practices.”
  (Source: 19-May-2014 Valeant Customer Letter)

- “We remain committed to support high potential R&D programs and new product launches”
  (Source: 19-May-2014 Valeant Customer Letter)

Valeant’s Purported $900mm of R&D Cuts is Unrealistic Given Its Stated Objectives in Continuing Certain R&D Projects Post-Closing

Source: Valeant company filings. Allergan management.
Note: Permission to use quotes was neither sought or received.
(1) As per R&D guidance issued on 7-May-2014.
What is the Relative Distribution Strength of Allergan vs. Valeant for Eye Care (1) In The Important Emerging Markets?

Relative performance in BRIC: FY 2013 Allergan’s Sales In BRIC Countries Are $184mm Compared To $43mm Of Valeant (2)

Bausch & Lomb Has a Significantly Weaker Market Share Position Relative to Allergan in the Brazil Ophthalmic Market (3)

Valeant Has Consistently Experienced Much Slower Growth in Russia Quarter over Quarter Relative to Allergan (4)

Valeant’s Presence is Immaterial in India’s Ophthalmology Market While Allergan is a Market Share Leader (5)

Bausch & Lomb’s Market Position in China’s Ophthalmic Market Continues to Deteriorate as Allergan Gains Market Share (6)

Allergan Has a Significantly Stronger Market Share Position in the Largest, Fastest Growing, Emerging Markets

(1) Excludes Retina.
(2) Source: IMS market data. Eye Care excluding Retina.
(3) Source: IMS market share data YTD as of Mar-2014.
(4) Source: IMS market share data YTD as of Mar-2014. US$ @ 2014 Budget Rates, Ex-Manufacturer Prices.
(5) Source: IMS market share data YTD as of Mar-2014.
(6) Source: IMS market share data YTD as of Mar-2014.
Is Valeant’s Stated Tax Rate Achievable and Sustainable?

**Tax Deferral Structures and Audit Risk**
- Valeant’s recent spate of acquisitions and restructurings appear to have resulted in multiple off-shore tax deferral structures.
- Although some companies can manage the heavy burden and heightened scrutiny of one deferral structure, using so many is provocatively aggressive, difficult to sustain and compounds risk in multiple jurisdictions.
- Taxing authorities are likely to heavily scrutinize Valeant’s tax-deferral structures and transfer pricing.

**Undisclosed Cash Tax Cost to Achieve “Tax Synergies”**
- Valeant’s offer indicates that certain tax synergies can be achieved to obtain a “high single digit” cash tax rate for the combined group.
- Valeant has not publicly disclosed the potential cash tax cost of achieving these synergies but it is likely that Valeant anticipates migrating certain Allergan IP into one of its offshore tax-deferral structures.
- The upfront cash tax cost of migrating IP could be substantial and such cost could take over a decade to recover through the low-taxed earnings of the migrated IP. The cash tax cost could also have a significant impact on the cash flows of the combined company while it is highly levered, which calls into question the true benefit and viability of obtaining and sustaining a “high single digit” combined tax rate.

**Tax Treatment of Transaction to Shareholders**
- Valeant’s offer as currently structured will result in the transaction being fully taxable to Allergan’s shareholders.
- Legislators in both the House and Senate have recently proposed changes to current US tax law which could make the resulting Valeant/Allergan entity a US tax resident, regardless of its place of incorporation, subjecting the combined Valeant/Allergan group and all of their subsidiaries to the US worldwide tax regime.

### Significantly Lower Tax Rate vs. Re-domiciled Pharma Peers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Tax Rate</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Tax Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Endo</td>
<td>~20%</td>
<td>Actavis</td>
<td>~16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jazz</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>Valeant / Allergan</td>
<td>“High Single-Digit”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perrigo</td>
<td>&quot;High Teens&quot;</td>
<td>Valeant Standalone</td>
<td>&quot;Low Single-Digit&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SEC filings. (1) Per respective investor presentations.
What Is The Difference Between Valeant's Reported And Adjusted Cash Flow?

$1,822mm cumulative differential between Adjusted Cash Flow and GAAP Cash Flow from 2010 – 2014

Incrementally growing difference between Adjusted Cash Flow and GAAP Cash Flow points towards eroding cash flow generating abilities

Source: SEC filings.
Note: Reviewed by independent consultants and forensic accountants.
How Does Valeant Bridge the Significant Gap Between Reported and Adjusted Earnings?

Valeant’s adjusted earnings represent a much rosier picture than reported earnings.

Source: Valeant 10-K and 10-Q.
Note: Reviewed by independent consultants and forensic accountants.

(1) This calculation of pro forma net income as disclosed in the 10-Ks and 10-Qs presents unaudited pro forma consolidated results of operations, as if the 2013 acquisitions had occurred as of January 1, 2012 and the 2012 acquisitions had occurred as of January 1, 2011.

(2) Valeant’s non-GAAP adjusted cash earnings disclosure reflects reported net income plus addbacks for certain expenses which Management claims to be either non-cash or non-recurring.
“We're short [Valeant] because it's a rollup. And **roll ups present a unique set of problems**. Roll ups are generally **accounting-driven**, and we certainly think **that's the case in [Valeant]**. We think [Valeant] is playing some very aggressive accounting games when they buy companies, write down the assets, and also engaged in what we call spring-loading.”

“But really, for us, and we were short before the [Allergan] announcement, a roll up is a roll up. And you have to analyze a company that’s **not growing organically** and has to deliver value by doing bigger and bigger acquisitions, and **usually the companies do an acquisition too far**.”

Jim Chanos (Kynikos Associates), CNBC May 15, 2014

“What about the business? **Managing the business gets half of management’s time; M&A opportunities absorb the rest**, according to the Chief Financial Officer, **Howard Bradley Schiller**.”

Grant’s Interest Rate Observer, March 7, 2014
### The Tyco Roll Up Did Not End Well – Is History Repeating Itself?

#### Significant Acquisitions During Dennis Kozlowski’s Tenure as CEO of Tyco

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Announced Date</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Size ($bn)</th>
<th>Market Cap @ Close ($bn)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul-1994</td>
<td>Kendall International</td>
<td>$ 1.4bn</td>
<td>$ 6.5bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-1997</td>
<td>ADT Limited</td>
<td>$ 5.3bn</td>
<td>$ 11.8bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec-1997</td>
<td>American Home Products</td>
<td>$ 1.8bn</td>
<td>$ 28.7bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-1998</td>
<td>United States Surgical Corp</td>
<td>$ 3.3bn</td>
<td>$ 29.9bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov-1998</td>
<td>AMP Incorporated</td>
<td>$ 12.5bn</td>
<td>$ 60.3bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-1999</td>
<td>Raychem Corporation</td>
<td>$ 3.3bn</td>
<td>$ 81.8bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep-1999</td>
<td>Siemens – Electromechanical</td>
<td>$ 1.1bn</td>
<td>$ 70.8bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun-2000</td>
<td>Mallinckrodt</td>
<td>$ 4.2bn</td>
<td>$ 76.0bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov-2000</td>
<td>Lucent Technologies</td>
<td>$ 2.5bn</td>
<td>$ 93.5bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec-2000</td>
<td>Simplex Time Recorder Co.</td>
<td>$ 1.2bn</td>
<td>$ 94.4bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-2001</td>
<td>CIT Group</td>
<td>$ 9.2bn</td>
<td>$ 99.4bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug-2001</td>
<td>Sensormatic Electronics</td>
<td>$ 2.3bn</td>
<td>$ 104.7bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct-2001</td>
<td>TyCom</td>
<td>$ 0.9bn</td>
<td>$ 108.5bn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Significant Acquisitions During Michael Pearson’s Tenure as CEO of Valeant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Announced Date</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Size ($bn)</th>
<th>Market Cap @ Close ($bn)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jun-2010</td>
<td>Biovail Corporation</td>
<td>$ 3.8bn</td>
<td>$ 7.7bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb-2011</td>
<td>PharmaSwiss</td>
<td>$ 0.5bn</td>
<td>$ 11.9bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-2011</td>
<td>Sanitas AB</td>
<td>$ 0.5bn</td>
<td>$ 11.9bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul-2011</td>
<td>Dermik Laboratories</td>
<td>$ 0.4bn</td>
<td>$ 13.5bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul-2011</td>
<td>Ortho Dermatologics</td>
<td>$ 0.3bn</td>
<td>$ 13.8bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov-2011</td>
<td>iNova</td>
<td>$ 0.7bn</td>
<td>$ 13.5bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun-2012</td>
<td>OraPharma</td>
<td>$ 0.4bn</td>
<td>$ 13.8bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep-2012</td>
<td>Medicis Pharmaceutical</td>
<td>$ 2.6bn</td>
<td>$ 17.7bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-2013</td>
<td>Obagi Medical Products</td>
<td>$ 0.4bn</td>
<td>$ 22.4bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-2013</td>
<td>Bausch &amp; Lomb</td>
<td>$ 8.7bn</td>
<td>$ 31.8bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec-2013</td>
<td>Solta Medical</td>
<td>$ 0.3bn</td>
<td>$ 45.0bn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/A >100 Total Acquisitions Announced

---

May-2001: Dennis Kozlowski (former CEO) outlines a five-year plan of adding another $50bn of acquisitions and reaching $100bn in sales

Following its tumultuous decline, Tyco eventually split into three companies

“...And Continuing

“We did set an aspirational target to be a top five pharma company by the end of 2016...that would be about $150 billion market cap roughly.”

– Michael Pearson, CEO of Valeant, 07-Jan-2014

Privately Michael Pearson has suggested that he may break Valeant into smaller companies – Is this true?
## What do Allergan Stockholders “Gain” by Merging with Valeant?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allergan Currently Has…</th>
<th>By Merging With Valeant, Allergan “Gains”…</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong, long-term organic growth fueled by innovation and marketing excellence</td>
<td>Anemic growth driven by what we believe are unsustainable price increases – not volume</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An extensive R&amp;D engine that has a longstanding track record of producing a +25x return on cumulative R&amp;D spend</td>
<td>Subscale Valeant products losing their market share</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion, sales and marketing effort focused on physician customer loyalty and service</td>
<td>A depleted R&amp;D engine cut by $900mm; abandonment or sale of pipeline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer awareness campaigns</td>
<td>Thin sales coverage focused on detailing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential to commercialize rich pipeline with billions of revenue and profit potential</td>
<td>Elimination of value added marketing programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-tailed blockbuster products</td>
<td>A decreased P/E multiple driven by reduced growth prospects and increased uncertainty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading positions in some of the largest and fastest growing emerging markets</td>
<td>Neglected coverage of key specialty areas including urology and plastic surgery, among others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong and stable management team and Board of Directors</td>
<td>Emerging market growth in smaller countries with less revenue potential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A positive net cash position and investment grade credit rating of A+ / A3</td>
<td>Increased pro forma debt and a high yield credit rating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An effective tax rate of ~26%</td>
<td>Lower tax regime with questionable sustainability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
May 27, 2014